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Cert to Michigan Ct of Appeals
(Danhof, Fitzgerald, and Walsh)

No. 74-653 CSY
MICHIGAN

State/ Criminal

v.
MOSLEY
1.

SUMMARY:

This petn presents the question as to the circum-

stances under which police officers can resume interrogation after a
defendant has indicated a reluctance to be questioned.
2.

-

FACTS:

Resp was convicted of felony-murder; the sentence does

not appear from the petn.

Acting on an anonymous phone tip, police arrested

resp and brought him to the station house for i nterrogation.

Resp asserts

that the arresting officer did not immediately take him to a magistrate for

-

, ,, ,

-

- 2 -

arraignment because h e f e lt he lack ed sufficient information.

Re s p was

given Miranda warnings and si g n ed an ac k nowledgment of their r e ceipt.
When offic e rs began to qu e stion him about robb e ries, he stated tha t he did
not want to talk a bout robberies, whereupon the questioning ceas ed.

A bout

two hours later, resp was taken to the Homicide Bureau, where he was

----------=-----

once more given Miranda w arnings.

It is not clear whether offic e rs in th e

Homicide Division had been made aware of resp's previously expressed
reluctance to talk.
the warnings.

Resp once again signed an acknowledgment of receipt of

When he was told that his accomplice in a robbery-murder

had confessed and laid all the blame upon him, resp confessed as to his
participation in the crime.

-

Resp' s conviction was reversed by the Michigan Court of Appeals,
which held that under Miranda once resp indicated that he would not talk abou t
robberies all interrogation must cease.

The Michigan CA relied on

Westover v. United States, a companion case to Miranda, in which the
Court invalidated a confession obtained by FBI agents after giving warnin g s
but given after the defendant had been in prolonged state custody without

.
i!

similar warnings.

This Court stated, how ever, that warnings in a second

interrogation removed in time and place from the first might be sufficient.
Review was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

extended Miranda.

P e tr contends that the Michigan CA has undul y

All petr argues is that resp was not placed under undue

pressure and knowingly waived his rights to rematn silent.

-

Unless the

decision below is review ed, petr says, police will be unable to interrogate
suspects for more than one crime at a time.

-

-

-

- 3 -

Resp says that the result was dictated by Miranda, which says that
once a defendant says he does not want to t?-lk all questioning must stop.
He further says that the Michigan courts are free to apply the protection
against self-incrimination more strictly than constitutionally required.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The opinion of the Michigan CA reveals that it

clearly felt that it was acting under federal constitutional compulsion.

------- -

EYen

-

so, the issue raised by this petn turns largely on the particular facts.

---

There is the additional complication that the original arrest may have been

--

unlawful, thus raising the question, raised in Brown v. Illinois, No. 73-6 650.
about the efficacy of the warnings.
There is a response .

-

-
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Michigan v. Mosley _

1

On the main issue the Michigan court must be reversed.
- -

-

Suppression of a confession made in these circumstances would
place an unnecessary and intolerable burden on police.

I

urge, however, that the holding be narrowly circumscribed to
the facts of this case, and that whoever writes the opinion
be careful to avoid loose language that could encourage abusive
police practices.

-

The following facts should be emphasized in the opinion:
(1)

There was no evidence of actual coercion, not even

from the testimony of Mosley himself.
While it is true that Miranda's prophylactic rules were
based in part on the "inherent" coercion of custodial interrogation, it is also true that the ultimate concern was with
actual coercion.

The Miranda warnings themselves should take

care of the effects of inherent coercion - that is why the
Court required them for all custodial interrogation.

- -

-Once

the warnings are given, the concern shifts to actual c oercion,

-

as shown by the fact that a confession obtained after the
warnings have been given can still be suppressed on a showing
of actual coercion .

•

I

.,

-

I

-

The
court can be read to undercut the argument of the preceding
paragraph:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease. At this point he has shown that he
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege;
any statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to
cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody
interrogation operates on· the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the
privilege has been once invoked. Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 473-474.
That passage appears to rest on the inevitability of compulsion,

-

"subtle or otherwise," from continued questioning after invocation of the right to remain silent.

But it is imp0ssible that

the Court intended that passage to be a categorical prohibition
of all further questioning because of inherent compulsion.
This much is clear from another passage of Miranda:
If the interrogation continues without the
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken,
a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the · defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to retained or appointed counsel. 384
U.S. at 475.
Both the right to an attorney and the right to remain silent

a.

are brought home toz suspect by the Miranda warnings.

If a

statement given after invocation of one (the right to an

-

attorney) can be proved vol~ntary then a statement given
1
after invocation of the other (the right to remain silent)

3.

-

also must be capable of being proved voluntary.

Invocation

of one of the rights does not make any subsequent statement

------

per se involuntary; it just impose~ a "heavy burden" on the

-

state to prove that the subsequent statement was indeed
voluntary.
Thus, the ultimate inquiry in this case, as in all cases
of statements given after previous invocation of the right
to remain silent, is whether or not the statement was in fact
voluntary.

The absence of all signs of actual coercion is

: )important factor in that determination.
(2)

The first officer to question Mosley was concerned
(robbery), while the second officer was

-

interested in a totally different and unrelated crime (an
earlie r murder).
The Michigan court considered this case to be an example
of "shuttling a person from one police officer to another for
purposes of questioning and thus justifying subsequent
interrogations after an election to remain silent.''
Petn. at 13.

Cert.

That is a misleading and perjorative

characterization of what happened.

The court's statement

conjures up an image of one officer trying and failing to get
information from Mosley, then taking him immediately to
another officer who tries and, upon like failure, takes him
on to a third, and so on.

Such a practice would be coercive

and I am confident that no Justice would allow it.

-

It is

important that the opinion in this case make clear the difference

4.

-

between the facts of this case and the hypothetical scene
I have just sketched.
A crucial fact, as I now understand the record from the
briefs, is that Officer Cowie and Sergeant Hill were working
independently on separate investigations.

They do not appear

to have been a team working on related crimes.

(The murder

about which Hill questioned Mosley occurred during one of a
series of robberies that included also the robberies about
which Cowie had tried to question Mosley.
at 5; Petr. Brief at 4 n. 3.

See Resp. Brief

But even so, there is no

indication that Cowie and Hill were working in tandem on the
overall series of robberies).

Equally important, prior to

rnoslc~

-

the phone call to Cowie that fingered :i:±tn there was no reason
for either, and much less both, of their investigations to
focus on Mosley.

There is no room for an inference that Cowie

and Hill prearranged the sequence of events at the stationhouse,
i.~., that one of them would try to crack Mosley and if he
failed the other would have a go.

All appearances indicate

that each officer was just doing his job in good faith.
All of that distinguishes this case from one in which
two officers who have been working together on one case or
related cases arrange to conduct in shifts what reasonably
should be one interrogation.

Such a ploy would be a blatant

attempt to circumvent Miranda and apply "subtle" pressure
to a suspect who once invokes his right to remain silent.

-

The opinion should avoid loose language that could suggest
approval of such a tactic.

r
5.

-

(3)

There were two complete sets of Miranda warnings,

strict compliance with Mosley's request after the first that
questioning cease, and no such request at all after the
second set.
The second complete set of Miranda warnings, c oupled with
good faith compliance with Mosley's wishes following the first,
I

irrnnediately distinguish this case from those in which the police~
at first respect a request to cease interrogation but then
return from a few seconds to several hours later to try "just
one more time."

Those latter cases include both the ones

where the police "refuse to take no for an answer" and keep
hammering away at the mute suspect, and those where they leave

-

the suspect alone for a long time and then drop back in
"casually" to ask "if you've changed your mind and want to
.

te 11 us a b out it now.

,,

The first type of case - where the police refuse to take
no for an answer - is an affront to Miranda and probably would
always be found to involve actual coercion.

The adherence to

Mosley's request f or cessation of questioning after the first
Miranda warnings distinguishes this case from that type.

The

second type of case - where the police come back later to see
if the suspect has "changed his mind about talking" - is a
closer question both as to whether the practice violates
Miranda and whether it involves coercion.

-

If it were held

to do either, it would be because it smacks of a trick1 an
attempt to confuse the suspect:

whereas the police left him

6.
alone at first, now they are back indicating that they again
expect him to talk.

But the second Miranda warnings in this

case remove all possibility of any confusion on the part of
Mosley .

He was told again, immediately before he confessed,

that he still had the right to remain silent.

Mosley raised a Wong Sun issue in the Michigan courts
based on the alleged unconstitutionality of his arrest.

The

state court of appeals (whose opinion we are reviewing) did
not discuss it, and Mosley raised but did not press it in his
brief,~ Resp. Brief at 17-18.

-

But Brown v. Illinois was

decided after the briefs were filed, and you can bet Mosley

.JL
l~ l
~

1

will press the Wong Sun point at oral argument.
The first question is whether h e can raise it here when
the state court never discussed it.

My understanding is that

he can, since he appears to have preserved it throughout the
state proceedings.

See Resp. Brief at 10-11.

The state court

did not suggest that the point was not properly before it,
but only that the court did not reach it because the Miranda
point was dispositive.

Cert. Petn at 11.

Since it appears to have been based on one anonymous
phone tip, the arrest probably fails to pass constitutional
muster for lack of probable cause.

Assuming that it was

indeed unconstitutional, Brown v. Illinois makes this a tough

-

case.

majority found that the taint had not

-

7.

•

dissipated because (1) the unconstitutionality of the arrest
was in a sense "purposeful" because it was undertaken purely
for investigatory reasons (slip op. at 14); (2) the arrest
and the confession were separated by less than two hours (id.);
(3) there was no intervening event of significance (id.). It's

----,

not easy to distinguish this case:

(1) From the facts set

out in the briefs, it appears that the arrest of Mosley was
knowingly effected without probable cause and for purposes of
investigation.

The only information linking Mosley to any

crimes was an anonymous phone call a day or two earlier.
Petr. Brief at 4 n. 3.

Moreover, Cowie testified that he

-

See

didn't think he had enough information to get a warrant.

-

See Resp. Brief at 5-6.

Anthony Smith's statement implicating

Mosley in the murder, which would have helped the police to
show probable cause

.for'

a

the arrest, apparently was not obtained

until after Mosley's arrest.

See Resp. Brief at 8 (recounting

Sergeant Hill's testimony that he spoke to Smith at least
three hours after Mosley's arrest).

It looks like·, both

Mosley and Smith (who had also been named by the anonymous
caller) were rounded up in the same investigative dragnet.
See id. at 6-7.

(2)

Mosley's confession was approximately

5-1/2 hours after his arrest, a ccording to the Michigan court.
Cert Petn at 12.

That's at least 3-1/2 hours longer than

in Brown, but how much can be made of that difference is
anyone's guess.

-

(3)

of any significance.

I can point to no intervening circumstance
All that happened between time of arrest

8.

and time of confession was that Mosley refused to talk and
cooled his heels in a hostile environment.

(If anything, it

can be argued with some force that the longer the time between
arrest and confession the less likely it is that the taint of
the illegal arrest will dissipate, if the time is spent in
custody at the stationhouse - the arrestee is likely to grow
more intimidated by the minute.

In this situation, 5~1/2

hours may be worse than the "less than two hours" in Brown
v. Illinois).

Certainly there was no intervening circum-

stance of the kind present in Wong Sun where Wong Sun was
released and then returned voluntarily several days later to
make a statement.

-

Because this case is so hard, if not impossible, to
distinguish from Brown on the Wong Sun point, I think you
will have a good chance of convincing the Conference to do
what you wanted them to do in Brown - remand to the state courts
for some fact-finding on the issue.

No court during this

entire litigatio~ has focused on the issues of the
constitutionality of the arrest or the dissipation of the
taint, if any.

In Brown, there had been at least some attention

to the point below.

(The trial court had made no finding

as to the arrest, but the state supreme court had reviewed the
record and found absence of probabl~ cause.

Slip op. at 6.)

And there has certainly been no attention to the question of
the officers' good faith in making the arrest without probable

-

cause.

(Given Cowie's testimony that he did not believe he

...

•

-

9•

had sufficient infonnation to get a warrant, it may be tough
for the state to show or even argue good faith, but it should
get some chance to do so.)

Especially disturbing in this case

is that the parties have not had a chance to brief the Wong
Sun issue in light of Brown. Given all this, the Court would
be well advised to limit its consideration to the main issue
presented by the opinion of the Michigan court, and then
(assuming reversal on that issue) remand to the state courts
for consideration of the Wong Sun issue.

Finally, a short word on the last argument in Respondent's

-

Brief, at 42-44.

As I understand it, Mosley argues that

Michigan has "taken over" the Miranda rules as part of its
own constitutional and statutory law, and then in addition
gone farther in interpreting its own Miranda-influenced
constitution and laws than this Court might go in interpreting
Miranda itself.

Stated differently, Miranda's federal

constitutional standards were the impetus for the Michigan
court's decision, but the decision really rested on its
interpretation of state law.
The upshot of Mosley's argument is that this Court cannot
reverse the Michigan court unless it can be certain that that
court's decision was not founded upon state law in the manner
(attempted to be) explained above.

-

Well, the Michigan court

cited no state constitutional provision or statute.

It did

.. ,• •

I

•

-

-

~

cite Miranda and quoted from it.

10.

It cited one state case

(People v. Robinson), but I have read that case and it seems
to be based on Miranda too. (It was cited by the Michigan court
here only for a collateral point anyway - that the appellate
court must independently determine voluntariness of a statement.)
I just cannot understand how Mosley can contend that the decision
below was based on anything but federal constitutional principles
derived from Miranda.

That being the case, Justice Blackmun's

statement in Oregon v. Hass (decided 3/19/75)* takes care of
any assertion that the state court can interpret the federal
Constitution

any more restrictively against the police than

does this Court.

-

P.J.
ss
,._.Hass suggests that "when state law is more res t rictive against
the prosecution than federal law, this Court has no power
"to compel a state to conform to federal law." . • . This,
apparently, is proferred as a reference to our expressions
that a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on police activity than those this
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional
standards • . . • But, of course, a State may not impose such
greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law
when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.
Oregon v . Hass, slip op, at 5 (emphasis in original) .

-

-

74-653

c~ ~ S; Li.£/ /1/utv Cl- "/ccf~ '

MICHIGAN v. MOSLEY

-

4

.

1-, "itf.

-rt,,

.

- - Argued 10/6/75

•'

-i.:..'1 h,,,. ~ ~,L.--' ~~~
~ ~~__/L f ~ " - ~._J---

~ ~~~ ~
1,..l~"~f- 1-o ~ .
~~
.
~

c1--

'-~4

~~-r~·J.--~ ~-1-f.

---

Q

-1~ ~

~ «>-<'--L-~..tc_

/-/._.........,._"'--- •-

C<-, ~<--....-::LA-- - ~

~

c!~,~ " ' - >

=--

1,-<-,~~c,..._, •

,v-y~~

1.4.~j';;..

/

ce,~-1 :i.~ ~c~ ~
1-r...-. a.- £---e ~t~~~

,c:~µ -~

;Z.7~

~

--11~ ~ zz.;.

-

~

A

~

Q.

~

•~

,~:z.._-

..
v ,

s/<✓f-

/ ~

~

1,,<,.-c:...<__

-

-~

~ L r i-0 ~.....,.......-~ •

'1::--'f

I Jf- "~--~---71u:...,,'-42.,. 6....£~~ t
~

-

jc/ud,j_, (

Cl,t~-

rv

"< lL

~) (

,,,-....6 L

c~.J}

~~ /4 - ~k--L ~ · < - ~
~,,,,..- IZ -~ /2~ /£.4 ~ ~ .,,R_ ~JJ~
,~
~ J - o-:1- ~ f - L ~ - - . , ~

72~

I

'%:2sc:14ZE //{_~ V

G✓

~"-id-ct.

~ ~/ ~~

n....,__,_,

✓-,

L-t_--

~ . ~ t.-\...--T.-e"-o f

-

•

/~

~u---- ~

L/(.A,~ C.:;f-

~<..t--~~~-X. ~

c-f

cv~

v.

I,

7

~

t__)

-

~ -,----,ze,,,~~

r----'~ -'t"'
9l-

_..'1.

-tu::r~

~4

•

4

1~ ,

L..<..<...-<....<'.>L-"-7,___

*

1

.

..

-

I J~_,__:,e (0-J)
~ .......~ . : : : J

--!J_ ~

/I~

~f,, t..<-L ,,,,_.e, - ~
--.c. "7 h - ~ -(

~~ .. --.. :::~-=•-_,.

~

~

~

t...--a-

l

/{-J. ..~ ~ ~ -

~ ~

-

<.-.-~ .,_,__ w.Q._

~ ~v ~ .

-

...c_..,c...w.------~~

~

~ ~

~- ~~~~
~ ~ ~~~---~~ c~~

-

~I-----~?)
~~~~

-

.

~

~

-"'----·-

~ ~ - ~ ~~·
~ ~-;-4,~ ~~ 4
~~~ -

. . ..

-

-

-

Z~/L,_,
( b"

V

L)_,

)~~
l ~~., ~ ~

l

~

y:

~ ~ ~
--.

~ ~

~.,..__.

,

...,._....,._....

~ ~ ~~

~

~~-~

~

-

7 ~,, hd
c? z ~

rt

,

I ~

/4 ~ ~ArJ-.
~~

~4.~

I I ~

~

~

,_

\\

-~~~~

i1J

~
J
,=,-~~
~
~ "'---'~'=3-~ ( ,=/ ~ ~ ~
~

c/~

/2-(j

-

-

~ ~
~

-~

\

d__,

4

~)

~ ,,-,....L ~ ..t, • ~ (
flt~ L A - .

Brennan, .,J,

.\ln r~li a 11. J .

•

£'J,.,

c-• ..

~

A

~

~~th,..L~,..,_

,2..-,~ ~

JL,4.c.U

~~~

-

,,§u:p-rttttt Q}ll'lttt of iii~ ~trifth ~~~

~a~lp:ng-fon. t9. (!}. 2llp'!,~
CHAMBERS OF

JUST I CE LEWIS F. P OWEL L,JR .

November 4, 1975

FILE COP'Y
PLEASE RETURN

TO F\LE

No. 74- 653

Michigan v. Mosley

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

--

-

/

{!Jomi 11f fltt ~ t h j)taftg
._,zu;frngbnt. 10 ♦ QJ. 2llp'1'

.$)ttprtttU

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

November 5, 1975

Re:

No. 74-653 - Michigan v. Mosley

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

11
• ) V
J

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

✓

-

•

~n.p-rtmt (!Jom-i of tlrt ~~ ~taf.eg
',Jrrudpnghtn. ~. (!J. 2Ilffe)!..;l

CHAMB E RS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 5, 1975

Re:

74- 653 - Michigan v. Mosley

Dear Potter :
I join your proposed opinion of
November 4, 1975 .

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

I

-

-

~- ~-~ m ......,__. -r 4-ht ~~4- .. ,- Si.h<~~o----r
....... ...,._ -,
ilJ.l. ..,..,
~"-~41 ,.;,1.u........ .,...
~--.1r

~;~Ii li.4\tctt. t9. ~- 2.ll.;r.>!.;l

CH AMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

/

November 6, 1975

Re:

N o . 7 4 -653

-

M i chi gan v. Mosley

Dear Potter:
Please join m e.
Sin cerely,

Mr . J ustice S t e w art

cc:

T he Con fe ren ce

-

-

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. J ustice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr . Just i ce Stewart
Mr. Just-ice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackrnun
~ Justi ce Powell
f~
J ustic e Rehnqui st
._,,1...J..

•

From: White, J .
Circulated: __j/- 1£-

1

DRAFT_

z..s-

Recirculated: _ _ __ _ _ _

o. 74-653

tate of Michigan, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to
v,
the Court of Appeals of
Richard Bert Mosley,
Michigan.
[December -, 1975]

MR. JusTICE WHITE, concurring.
I concur in the result and in much of the majority's
reasoning. However, it appears to me that, in an effort
to make only a limited holding in this case, the majority
has implied that some custodial confessions~presse even o
ey o ow an mformea and vo1uiiiary w a i ~ t ' s rights':'" Th-;- majority
seems to say tha a statement obtained within some unspecified time after an assertion by an individual of his
"right to silence" is always inadmissible, even if it was
the result of an informed and voluntary decision-following, for example, a disclosure to such an individual
of a piece of information bearing on his waiver decision
which the police had failed to give him prior to his assertion of the privilege but which they gave him immediately thereafter. Indeed, at p. 6, the majority characterizes as "absurd" any contrary rule. I disagree, I don't
think the majority's conclusion is compelled by Miranda
. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and I suspect that in the final
analysis the majority will adopt voluntariness as the
standard by which to judge the waiver of the right to
silence by a properly informed defendant. I think the
Court should szy ~ now.
Mi~a holds that custody creates an inherent compulsion on an individ ual to incriminate himself in response to questions, and that statements obtained under
such circumstances are therefore obtained in violation
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of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
testimonial self-incrimination unless the privilege is
" knowingly and intelligently waived." Id., at 471 , 475.
It also holds that an inqividual will not be deemed to
have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his "right
to silence" unless the authorities have first informed him,
inter alia, of that right-"the threshold requirement for
an intelligent decision as to its exercise.)) Id., at 468.
I am no more convinced that Miranda was required by the
United States Constitution than I was when it was decided. However, there is at least some support in the
law both before and after Miranda for the proposition
that some rights will never be deemed ' waived unless
the defendant is first expressly advised of their existence.
E. g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238; Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11; Fed.
Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (a ) (2) . There is little support in/
the law or in commonsense for the proposition that an
informed waiver of a right may be ineffective even where
voluntarily made. Indeed, the law is exactly to the contrary, e. g., Tollett v. H enderJon, 411 U. S. 258; Brady v.
Uni ted States, 397 U. S. 742; McMann v. Richardson,
397 U. S. 759:; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790.
Unless an individual is incompetent, we have in the past
rejected any paternalistic rule protecting a d~fendant
from his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his
own criminal case. Faretta v. California, 43 U. S. L. W.
5005. To do so would be to "imprison a man in his privileges," 1 Adams ex rel. McCann v. United States, 317
1 The maJority's rule may cause an accused injury.
Although a
recently arrested individual may have indicated an initial desire
not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want to know immediately-if 1t were true-that his abiiity to explain a particular
incrimmating fact or to supply an alibi for a particular time period
would result m his JIIlmediate release. Similarly, he might wish to
know~ 1£ 't were t rne-that (1} the case against him was unusually
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U. S. 269, 280, and to disregard " 'the respect for the individual which is · the lifeblood of the law,' " Faretta v,
California, at 5012. I am very reluctant to conclude
that Miranda stands for such a proposition.
The language of Miranda no more compels such a result than does its basic rationale. As the majority points
out, the statement in Miranda, at 474,. requiring interrogation to cease after an assertion of the "right to silence"
tells us nothing because it does not indicate how soon this
interrogation 111ay resume. The Court showed in the
very next paragraph, moreover, that when it wanted to
create a per se rule against further interrogation after
assertion of a right, it knew how to do so. The Court
there said "if the individual indicates that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney
is present." I d., at 474.2 However, when the individual
strong and (2) that his immediate cooperation with t he aut horities
in t he apprehension and conviction of ot hers or in the recovery of
p roperty would redound to his benefit in the form of a reduced
charge. Certainly the individual's lawyer, if he had one, would be
interested in such information, even if communication of such information followed closely on an assertio11 of the "right to silence."
Where the individual has not requested counsel and has chosen
instead to make his own decisions regarding his conversations with
t he authorities, he shou ld not be deprived even temporarily of any
information relevant to t he decision.
2 The question of the proper procedure following expression by an
individual of his desire to consult counsel is not presented in t his
case. It is sufficient to note that the reasons to keep the lines of
communication between t he authorities and t he accused open when
the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not present
when he indicates instead that he wishes legal advise with respect
thereto. The authorities may then communicate with him t hrough
an attorney . More to the point, the accused having expressed his
own view that he 1s not competent to deal with t he authorities
without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities' insistance
t o make a statement without counsel 's presence may properly be
viewed with skepticism,
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indicates th~t he will decide unaided by counsel whether
or not to assert his "right to silence" the situation is dif~
ferent. In such a situation, the Court in Miranda simply
said, "if the interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden
rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel." Id. , at 475. Apparently, although
placing a heavy burden on the Government, Miranda
intended waiver of the "right to silence" to be tested by
the normal •standards. In any event, insofar as the
Miranda decision might be read to require interrogation
to cease for some magical and unspecified period of time
following an assertion of the' "right to silence," and to
reject voluntariness as the standard by which to judge
informed waivers of that right, it should be disapproved
as inconsistent with otherwise uniformly applied legal
principles.
In justifying the implication that questioning must
inevitably cease for some unspecified period of time
following an exercise of the '.'right to silence," the majority says only that such a requirement would be necessary to avoid '(undermining" "the will of the person being
questioned." Yet surely a waiver of the "right to silence" obtained by "undermining the will" of the person
being questioned would be considered an involuntary
waiver. Thus, in order to achieve the majority's only
stated purpose, it is sufficient to exclude all confessions
which are the result of involuntary waivers. To exclude any others is to deprive the factfinding process of
highly probative information for no reason at all. The
" repeated rounds" of questioning following an assertion
of the privilege, which the majority is worried about~
would, of course, count heavily against the State in any
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determination of voluntariness-particularly if no reason
(such as new facts communicated to the accused or a new
incident being inquired about) appeared for repeated
questioning. There is no reason, however, to rob the
accused of the choice to answer questions voluntarily for
some magical period of time following his own previous
contrary decision . The Court should now so state.
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November 18. 1975

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: . No . 74-653 - - State of Michigan v. Richard Bert Mosley

D e ar Bill:
Please join me in your dissent .
Sincerely.

-;:ff ' /

{/ / ' (

T.M .
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

-

-

.Snpunu C!}itltrl of tqt 'J!lnruh .$)hut.tr
:JfasJrngLm, ~. QI. 2llffeJ!.~

/

CHAMBERS O F

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re : No. 74-653, Michigan v. Mosley
This opinion will not be announced this week. I did
not see Bill Brennanvs substantially revised dissenting opinion
until Saturday. I contemplate adding a couple of footnotes to
the Court opinion responding to his dissent, and did not want to
get t~e print shop involved in overtime.

n Cb ·
.I

I
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•

.§np-rtmt <Q:o-ud of tqt ~tti±t?t .§tattg
'JJJ,u;qmghm. 1I}. (Q:. 20~J.l.,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR.

December 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE:

No~ 74-653 Michigan v. Mosley

In the first sentence of the second paragraph
on page 6, "appointment" should be changed to "presence."

W.J.B. Jr.
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